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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
No. 17-3099 
________________ 
 
HAROLD J. DAGGETT, Individually and in his capacity as President of the 
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; DENNIS DAGGETT, 
Individually and in his capacity as President of Local 1804-1, International 
Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; WM. BERNARD DUDLEY, Individually and 
in his capacity as President of Local 1233, International Longshoremen’s Association, 
AFL-CIO; RICHARD SUAREZ, Individually and in his capacity as President of Local 
1235, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; JAMES MCNAMARA, 
Individually and as the Public Relations Director of the International Longshoremen’s 
Association, AFL-CIO; and DAVID CICALESE, Individually and in his capacity as 
President of Local 1, International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 
 
           Appellants 
 
v. 
 
WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR  
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-04314) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas  
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 1, 2018  
 
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: May 30, 2019) 
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OPINION∗ 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss regarding 
subpoenas issued by defendants in connection with a 2016 work stoppage.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint.   
I 
Plaintiffs are various leaders of the International Longshoremen’s Association, 
AFL-CIO (ILA),1 a union of maritime workers that negotiates a collective bargaining 
agreement on behalf of its members with the New York Shipping Association (NYSA).  
NYSA is an organization that represents businesses within the Port of New York and 
New Jersey.  Defendant is the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, an entity 
created by the 1953 Waterfront Commission Compact established between New York 
and New Jersey and approved by Congress.  
On the morning of January 29, 2016, a number of ILA-represented employees 
working on the New Jersey side of the Port stopped working for an unspecified reason.  
The work stoppage did not take place at every marine terminal; some workers continued 
to work.  In response to the stoppage and in conjunction with the collective bargaining 
                                              
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 As this appeal comes to us at the motion to dismiss stage, we take the well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint to be true.  Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC, 820 F.3d 
80, 87 n.12 (3d Cir. 2016).   
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agreement between the ILA and the NYSA, an emergency arbitration was scheduled for 
the same afternoon.  The arbitrator ruled that the work stoppage was in violation of the 
no-strike provision of the collective bargaining agreement.  Following that ruling, the 
ILA urged its members to return to work.  Despite this, both before and for several 
months after the arbitrator’s decision, the Commission issued subpoenas to rank-and-file 
ILA members to determine who ordered the walkout and why.  
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, and defendant removed 
the case to the District Court of New Jersey, arguing that the subpoenas infringe on 
employees’ right to engage in concerted activities under Section 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act as well as the Compact2 (Count I) and on employees’ right to strike under 
the Compact (Count II).3  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and 
the District Court granted the motion in full, dismissing the case without prejudice.  
Plaintiffs elected to stand on their dismissed complaint, and the District Court issued a 
final order of judgment.  Plaintiffs now appeal.    
                                              
2 The relevant portion of the Compact, Section XV(1), is codified under New Jersey 
law at N.J.S.A. § 32:23-68.  For purposes of this opinion, citations to New Jersey’s 
statutes refer to statutory text published before changes made by the New Jersey 
legislature in January 2018.  See 2017 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 324 (West 2018).  The 
bill enacting these changes, New Jersey Senate Bill No. 3502, which sought to withdraw 
New Jersey from the Waterfront Compact, was invalidated on May 29, 2019.  Waterfront 
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Murphy, No. 18-650, 2019 WL 2281574, at *9 (D.N.J. May 
29, 2019). 
3 The complaint also contained a third count that claimed the subpoenas violated the 
New Jersey Constitution, but plaintiffs have not raised this issue on appeal.  
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II4 
 On appeal, plaintiffs make four arguments to reinstate Count I and one to reinstate 
Count II.  None of them has merit.    
 Plaintiffs first argue that the District Court improperly deferred to the arbitrator’s 
ruling without developing its own factual record.  But the District Court did not “defer” 
to the arbitrator’s ruling; it simply had nothing else to rely on.  The cases that plaintiffs 
cite regarding deferral are exclusively NLRB actions where an ALJ had chosen to defer 
or not defer to an arbitrator, and therefore have no bearing here.5  In this case, plaintiffs 
failed to plead anything about the arbitration decision other than its occurrence and its 
primary rationale.  Even in their opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs did not 
indicate that the arbitration decision was contrary to any other facts relevant to the case.  
Rather, the complaint notes that “[n]either NYSA nor the ILA initiated any charges at the 
National Labor Relations Board . . . arising out of the work stoppage or the arbitration 
award; nor has any party brought any action in federal or state court arising out of the 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the 
Waterfront Commission Compact, by virtue of its approval by Congress in 1953, 
constitutes federal law for subject-matter jurisdiction purposes.  Waterfront Comm’n of 
N.Y. Harbor v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1998).  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise “plenary review of a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”  Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Restaurant 
Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).   
5 E.g., NLRB v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 930 F.2d 316, 322 (3d Cir. 1991) (“We have 
explicitly recognized the importance of the Board’s condition that deferral depends on 
the arbitrator’s consideration of the statutory issue.” (emphasis added)); NLRB v. Gen. 
Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1981) (enforcement petition brought by NLRB 
after ALJ hearing); Verizon New England, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 222 (2015) (NLRB panel 
review of ALJ decision).  
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work stoppage or the arbitration award.”6  The District Court therefore had no indication 
that plaintiffs had any objection to the arbitration ruling.  As a result, the District Court’s 
use of the arbitration award as a fact supporting dismissal was not in error.7  
Plaintiffs also claim that the Commission condoned the stoppage when it allowed 
the striking workers to return to work without repercussions.  We need not reach this 
question because the question was not raised below by plaintiffs and is thus waived.8    
Next, plaintiffs argue that unauthorized strikes are only unprotected under the 
NLRA when the strike is meant to usurp the union’s role as bargaining representative, 
citing Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. NLRB.9  But this characterization reverses our analysis in 
Food Fair, which noted that while “in some situations unauthorized activity by 
employees might enhance the authority of the union and aid the collective bargaining 
process,” only unusual cases would result in unauthorized activity being protected.10  
Plaintiffs urge, in the absence of any allegation of the purpose of the strike, to find that 
the strike falls within this limited exception.  Although reasonable inferences are to be 
drawn in their favor at the pleading stage,11 plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to 
                                              
6 App. 48–49 ¶ 27. 
7 To the extent that plaintiffs contest the arbitration award indirectly for the first time on 
appeal, that argument is waived, as the Commission put the arbitration award at issue in 
its motion to dismiss and plaintiffs failed to address it in their opposition brief. VICI 
Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014).  
8 Id. at 288 (“It is axiomatic that arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are 
deemed to be waived and consequently are not susceptible to review in this court absent 
exceptional circumstances.” (quoting Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d 
Cir. 2011))).  
9 491 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1974). 
10 491 F.2d at 394–95 & n.6. 
11 Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018).  
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make that reading plausible.  We therefore will not reverse the District Court’s ruling on 
this ground.12  
Finally, plaintiffs object to the District Court’s holding that an investigation under 
the Compact has to be “futile” in order to be actionable, instead advocating for an inquiry 
into whether the subpoenas were unrelated to the objectives of the Compact and limited 
the workers’ right to strike in any way.  Plaintiffs rely on a Supreme Court case about a 
concerted partial strike to support this theory, which they argue overruled the precedent 
relied on by the District Court.13  In doing so, they extend the Supreme Court’s logic too 
far, attempting to apply a holding striking down “state regulation of partial strike 
activities”14 to this case, in which a total strike occurred.  In the absence of any other 
authority, plaintiffs’ argument must fail.  
As to Count II, plaintiffs contend that the Commission’s issuance of subpoenas 
and characterization of the strike as “illegal” limits employees’ right to strike and chills 
future strikes.  They quote the Compact directly, which states that “nothing contained in 
                                              
12 Even if we were to credit plaintiffs’ argument on this point, we determined above that 
the District Court did not err by relying on the arbitrator’s finding of a violation of the 
no-strike provision.  That is independently sufficient to affirm the District Court here, as 
strikes in violation of a no-strike provision are clearly unprotected.  Food Fair, 491 F.2d 
at 393, 395. 
13 Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations 
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).  Partial strikes differ from total strikes in that they 
constitute a “concerted refusal by employees to do only part of their assigned tasks.”  
Comment, The Partial Strike, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 765 (1954).  Unlike in Machinists, 
where the employees refused to work a longer workweek than their expiring collective 
bargaining agreement required, 427 U.S. at 134, the stoppage here was a full stoppage 
and thus not a partial strike.   
14 Machinists, 427 U.S. at 151. 
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this compact shall be construed to limit in any way the right of employees to strike,”15 
and argue that less intrusive activity has been held to create a chilling effect.  The District 
Court relied on language from this Court stating that this provision “is not absolute” and 
that “collective bargaining rights cannot supersede ‘the Commission’s supervisory role 
regarding practices that might lead to corruption.’”16  We agree.  Indeed, plaintiffs’ 
reading of the Compact language ignores the fact that a no-strike provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement is not itself subject to the Compact provision, as it is not 
“contained in this compact.”  Accordingly, based on the facts pled in the complaint, it is 
not plausible that the language in the Compact gives rise to a claim for relief.  
Plaintiffs’ claims, with additional facts regarding the no-strike provision or the 
emergency arbitration, might surpass the plausibility threshold under Rule 12(b)(6).  But 
since plaintiffs chose to stand on their complaint rather than amend it, reasonable 
inferences can only take us so far in filling in the gaps in the complaint.  Therefore, we 
reject plaintiffs’ invitation to reinstate their claims under the NLRA and the Compact.  
III  
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
15 N.J.S.A. § 32:23-68. 
16 N.Y. Shipping Ass’n v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 835 F.3d 344, 357 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 764 F.2d 
961, 966-67 (3d Cir. 1985). 
